Stedman v Haven Leisure
Stedman v Haven Leisure Ltd [2025] EAT 82
Facts
Mr Harry Stedman (the Appellant), who has diagnoses of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), brought claims of disability discrimination against Haven Leisure Ltd (the Respondent) after his application for employment as an Animation Host was unsuccessful.
At a preliminary hearing on 7 November 2023, the Employment Judge decided that Mr Stedman was not disabled within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010). The Employment Judge's conclusion was based on considering Mr Stedman's Impact Statement and oral evidence. While accepting Mr Stedman had a mental impairment, the Tribunal found his reported difficulties with day-to-day activities were "what one might expect from somebody who is not disabled". Specifically, the Tribunal noted he was a "social person," performed in public, had academic successes, and only had problems with public transport when "overcrowded". The Tribunal concluded his disability did not have a "substantial impact" on his normal day-to-day activities.
Mr Stedman appealed this judgment, arguing primarily that the decision was perverse, that the Judge failed to recognise substantial adverse effects on his day-to-day activities (such as difficulty forming friendships, inability to use crowded public transport), and erred by focusing on what he could do rather than what he could not.
Held
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), presided over by Judge Stout, allowed the appeal and set aside the Employment Tribunal's decision, remitting the matter to a fresh Tribunal to determine afresh whether Mr Stedman is disabled under section 6 of the EA 2010.
The EAT found that the Employment Tribunal made a number of errors in its application of the law:
Ground 1 (Perversity regarding Professor Fox's report): This ground failed. The EAT determined that Professor Fox’s report, which confirmed Mr Stedman's ASD and ADHD diagnoses, did not contain uncontroverted medical evidence that the Tribunal was bound to accept regarding the impact of the impairment. It was reasonable for the Tribunal to focus on Mr Stedman's Impact Statement as the primary evidence of his difficulties, rather than supplementing from the Fox report.
Significance of a Diagnosis (Obiter): While dismissing Ground 1, the EAT clarified an important principle: a diagnosis of ASD or ADHD is not to be regarded only as constituting the ‘impairment’. The diagnosis itself reflects a clinician’s opinion on the extent to which an individual’s functioning differs to the ‘norm’, and is therefore a relevant factor for the Tribunal to take into account when considering whether the impairment has a ‘substantial adverse effect’. Tribunals must engage with the clinician's view if the difficulties are significant enough to merit a diagnosis.
Ground 2 (Failure to recognise substantial adverse effects): This ground succeeded. The Tribunal erred by failing to keep in mind three key principles:
The comparison for "substantial adverse effect" is between the claimant as they are with the impairment and as they hypothetically would be without the impairment.
It is sufficient if the claimant has a substantial adverse effect on just one day-to-day activity.
The Tribunal must not weigh what a claimant cannot do against what they can do. The Tribunal's conclusions that Mr Stedman's difficulties forming friendships were "what one might expect from somebody who is not disabled," and that his difficulties with overcrowded public transport were not substantial, were found to be perverse because they lacked sufficient explanation or misapplied the comparison test.
Ground 3 (Failure to deal with matters in Impact Statement): This ground succeeded in part. The Tribunal erred by not specifically addressing Mr Stedman's evidence regarding excluding himself from social activities and struggles to interact and communicate with colleagues and customers from his Impact Statement. The EAT rejected the respondent's argument that social anxiety was unconnected to autism, noting the claimant's statement that his autism "creates" social anxiety. However, the EAT found the Tribunal had sufficiently dealt with memory difficulties related to shopping lists and concentration difficulties (though noting the Tribunal's reasoning for the latter was inadequate).
Ground 4 (Focusing on what the claimant can do): This ground succeeded. The Tribunal impermissibly focused on what Mr Stedman could do (e.g., performing in public, academic success, using uncrowded public transport) and weighed this against his stated difficulties, rather than focusing on what he cannot do or can do only with significant difficulty. The EAT reiterated that this "weighing" approach is not allowed when assessing disability.
The EAT concluded that the Employment Judge's decision was "totally flawed" and required the matter to be remitted to a fresh Tribunal to ensure a completely fresh assessment.
Comment
This case provides significant clarification on the assessment of disability under section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. It reinforces several crucial principles for Employment Tribunals:
The definition of "substantial" means "more than minor or trivial", and the focus should always be on what an individual cannot do or can do only with difficulty, rather than what they can do. Tribunals must not weigh a claimant's abilities against their difficulties.
An impairment only needs to have a substantial adverse effect on just one day-to-day activity for a person to be considered disabled. It is impermissible to weigh one type of day-to-day activity against another.
The comparison to determine if an effect is substantial is between the claimant as they are with the impairment and as they hypothetically would be without the impairment. Tribunals should not compare the claimant to an "average" or "non-disabled" person in general.
Crucially, a clinical diagnosis (such as ASD or ADHD) is not merely evidence of an impairment, but is also a relevant factor for assessing the impact of that impairment and whether it has a substantial adverse effect. Such a diagnosis reflects a clinician's judgment that an individual's functioning is "significantly different from the norm" in the areas covered by the diagnosis. Tribunals should engage with this clinical view in their reasoning.
The case serves as a strong reminder that while academic achievements or social performance might appear to contradict claims of difficulty, they do not necessarily negate the existence of substantial adverse effects caused by conditions like ASD and ADHD, especially when assessed against the hypothetical individual without the impairment.
